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Actions in Practice: 
On details in collections1 
 
 
Rebecca Clift and Chase Wesley Raymond 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Several of the contributions to the Lynch, et al. (2016) special issue make the claim that 
conversation-analytic research into epistemics is “routinely crafted at the expense of actual, 
produced and constitutive detail, and what that detail may show us” (Macbeth and Wong, 
2016: 585-6). Here we seek to address the inappositeness of this critique by tracing precisely 
how it is that recognisable actions emerge from distinct practices of interaction. We begin by 
reviewing some of the foundational tenets of conversation-analytic theory and method—
including the relationship between position and composition, and the making of collections—
as these appear to be primary sources of confusion for many of the contributors to the Lynch, 
et al. special issue. We then target some of the specific arguments presented in the special 
issue, including the alleged ‘over-hearer’s’ writing of metrics, the provision of so-called 
‘alternative’ analyses, and the supposed ‘crafting’ of generalizations in epistemics research. In 
addition, in light of Lynch’s (2016: 18) more general assertion that CA has recently been 
experiencing a “rapprochement” with what he disparagingly refers to as the “juggernaut” of 
linguistics, we discuss the specific expertise that linguists have to offer in analyzing particular 
sorts of interactional detail. The paper as a whole thus illustrates that, rather than being 
produced “at the expense of actual, produced and constitutive detail,” conversation-analytic 
findings—including its work in epistemics—are unambiguously anchored in such detail. We 
conclude by offering our comments as to the link between CA and linguistics more generally, 
arguing that this relationship has long proven to be—and indeed continues to be—a mutually 
beneficial one.  
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1 We are deeply indebted to Galina Bolden, Steve Clayman, Paul Drew, Barbara Fox, John Heritage, Doug Maynard, 
and Geoff Raymond for their scrupulous reading of previous drafts of this paper. Their comments have 
encouraged us to clarify and refine various parts of our argument. We alone are responsible for any remaining 
shortcomings.  
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Introduction 
 
In a position paper examining what he and others (e.g., Lynch et al., 2016) understand to be 
the ‘Epistemics Program’ (sic), Lynch refers, with evident distaste, to “a recent trend (indeed, a 
juggernaut) in CA, involving a rapprochement with linguistics…” (2016: 18).2 To cast the 
relationship between CA and linguistics as a “rapprochement”—and a recent one, at that—is to 
misunderstand both this relationship and its history. In the first instance, as Schegloff (1991: 
46) describes it, CA exists “at a point where linguistics and sociology (and several other 
disciplines, anthropology and psychology among them) meet”3, and indeed its outward 
orientations from the early days have been linguistic.4 Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
the appearance of the two foundational CA papers by Sacks et al. (1974) and Schegloff et al. 
(1977) in the most prominent linguistics journal, Language.5,6  
 
A more accurate description would be that the interest of linguists in CA has been gathering 
pace over the last twenty years; that is, the momentum is surely in the direction of linguistics 
towards CA, rather than the other way around (see, e.g., Clift, 2016). This, then, is a perspective 
from linguistics: an attempt to throw some light on why CA—including its work in 
epistemics—provides for linguistics some of its most compelling discoveries and most 
innovative insights.  
 
In what follows, we address the general charge of Lynch et al., namely that what they 
misleadingly call the ‘Epistemics Program’—but which we describe here as work in 
epistemics—is cognitivist in its methods and in its analyses. We take as our starting point an 
assertion made by Macbeth and Wong, which they pose as a puzzle:  
 
“A central and recurrent puzzle for our reading of the Epistemic Program (sic) is 
how occasioned production features of turn and sequence…are rendered 
expressions of a durable formal structure operating in the background. 
Transcript is animated on behalf of an omnipresent engine of ‘epistemic order’ 
(Heritage, 2008: 309). These renderings are programmatic achievements, 
generic in their terms and operations, and treated as causative of what order 
may be found on any actual occasion. This would seem to be the central aim and 
achievement of the EP’s animations, notwithstanding that generalisations such 
as these are routinely crafted at the expense of actual, produced and constitutive 
detail, and what that detail may show us” (Macbeth and Wong, 2016: 585-6). 
 
                                                        
2 Notwithstanding that a major contributor to their volume is an applied linguist, Jean Wong. 
3 It is no accident that in the (2012) special issue of Research on Language and Social Interaction, which is the main 
target of Lynch et al.’s critique, the invited commentators were not only a sociologist (Drew), but also, by training 
and institutional commitment, an anthropologist (Sidnell) and linguist (Clift). 
4 “From early on it seemed clear that some parts of the enterprise of understanding conversation would rest 
heavily on the contribution of linguists” (Schegloff, 1996d: 53; see also Clift, 2016). 
5 Moreover, as Joseph (2003: 463) points out, Sacks et al. (1974) is “by far the most cited” article to have appeared 
in the journal since its inception in 1924. 
6 Schegloff’s continuing engagement with linguistics is evident at all stages of his work, from earlier to later 
papers (e.g., Schegloff 1979, 1988, 1996b, 1998, 2005).  
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In the first place, we find ourselves entirely at one with Macbeth and Wong in their disavowal 
of “generalisations…crafted at the expense of actual, produced and constitutive detail”. Indeed, 
in her commentary on Heritage (2012a,b), Clift (2012) cites with approval Evans and 
Levinson’s observation that we are all ultimately in search of the highest-level generalisations 
with “empirical bite” (2009: 475), and thereafter sets out the reasons why work in epistemics 
has indeed achieved this (2012: 69). The dominant paradigm in linguistics for the last half-
century has, after all, centred on Chomsky’s ‘ideal speaker-listener’ (1965: 3), producing 
exactly those generalisations at the expense of “bite” from which we, along with Macbeth and 
Wong, are in flight. Given that the Chomskyan paradigm is an inherently cognitive one, as 
linguists, we are inclined to recognise cognitivism where we see it. The puzzle for us here is to 
reconcile Macbeth and Wong’s characterisation of work in epistemics with our experience of 
it.  
 
Before turning to epistemics in particular, let us retrace our steps to track how generalisations 
in CA emerge from “actual, produced and constitutive detail”. In so doing, we suggest that the 
puzzle may be solved by revisiting how recognisable actions emerge from distinct practices of 
interaction. The inextricable link between the details of talk, and the actions that the talk is 
effecting, is made clear in Schegloff’s insistence that analysts must show how a specific action 
has been “recognized by co-participants as that action by virtue of the practices that produced 
it” (2007: 7). As we will demonstrate, while several of the articles in the Lynch et al. special 
issue echo Schegloff’s sentiment (e.g., Lindwall et al. 2016: 519), their claim to analyze action 
is nonetheless severely undermined by their disregard for the practices that constitute it. Such 
an approach risks occluding the fact that actions are tethered in the details of practices; an 
account that floats free of the practices that produced it cannot, by definition, be an empirical 
account of action. 
 
Thus we start with a basic methodological principle in CA—that which relates the composition 
of a turn-at-talk to its position in sequence—and then discuss a basic methodological practice: 
that of assembling collections. These preliminaries then provide the foundation from which to 
show what the “actual, produced and constitutive detail” of talk may show us. It is from these 
details that generalizations emerge, thereby allowing us to see cognition, not as a “hidden” 
order (Lynch and Wong, 2016), “operating in the background” (Macbeth and Wong, 2016: 585-
6), but rather as lodged firmly—and publicly (Garfinkel, 1967)—in sequences of interaction. 
Finally, we consider the contribution that linguists, with their distinct perspectives on, and 
management of, interactional detail, are particularly able to make to conversation-analytic 
work. 
 
 
1. Methodological preliminaries  
 
a)  On ‘position’ and ‘composition’  
 
Linguistic theory, at whatever level of description—phonetic, morphological, syntactic or 
semantic—has overwhelmingly concentrated on the compositional elements of language.  
Even in the cases where sentences or utterances are not invented, but naturally-occurring, 
claims about language use have tended to be based on single, decontextualised sentences or 
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utterances. What CA method exhorts us to remember is the position in composition (Clift, et al., 
2013): specifically, Schegloff’s observation that “...both position and composition are 
ordinarily constitutive of the sense and import of an element of conduct that embodies some 
phenomenon or practice” (1993: 121).  
To take a simple example, the phrase ‘thank you’, with stress on ‘thank’, inherently announces 
itself as initiating thanks; the phrase ‘thank you’ announces itself as responding to a prior 
expression of thanks. In such a case, the prosodic practice of stressing either ‘thank’ or ‘you’ 
marks the turn as, respectively, initiating or responding. In a similar vein, Schegloff (2002: 
374, fn. 21) cites Sacks’s early observation that repeats—for example, second summonses—
are “distinctively done as ‘repeats’,” such that “even if the first was not heard, the second can 
be heard as a ‘repeat’” due to its “upgraded” design (Schegloff 2007: 52). So doing something 
‘as a repeat’ is a practice that is implemented in various ways; and so powerful is the link 
between position and composition that the design of the turn can indicate its position for a 
hearer, even when the hearer has not heard the first attempt.  
In the examples just mentioned, positionality was indicated at the prosodic level; but of 
course, interactional resources may differ from language to language. In Arabic, the distinction 
between an initial and responsive greeting, for example, is marked lexically and 
morphosyntactically. The following are some exemplars taken from Saudi Arabic data:7 
(1) 
1 A: marḥaba 
Hello 
2 B: marḥabte:n 
hello (dual pronoun) 
Two hello(s) 
 
(2) 
1 A: ʔssalamuʕalaykum 
The peace on you (pl) 
Peace (be upon) you 
2 B: ʕalaykumessalam 
On you (pl) the peace 
(Upon) you the peace 
 
(3)  
1 A: Ṣabaḥelxe:r 
Morning the good 
Good morning 
2 B: Ṣabaḥennw:r 
Morning the light 
Bright morning 
                                                        
7 We thank Faye Abu Abah for use of these excerpts from her data. 
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In each case in (1) – (3) above, the initiating greeting is met by a turn which is 
lexically/morphologically formatted as responsive; the response retains a component of the 
initial greeting but returns this through the recurrent practice of modifying the original—
whether in (1) by means of pluralisation, in (2) by modified word order,8 or in (3) by 
modifying the assessment item. These exemplars capture a basic general observation: that 
position is inherently indexed in composition. But arriving at this generalisation is not by 
means of “crafting”; nor has the transcript been “animated” in any way. Such observations are 
only possible because they are grounded in collections of exemplars. On the well-known 
principle that two may be a coincidence, but three (or indeed more) is a pattern, the 
collections tell their own story. It is thus collections of cases that, to quote Heritage (this issue), 
force us to our conclusions. 
Failure to acknowledge the normatively intertwined relationship between position and 
composition appears to be the source of much confusion in the Lynch et al. (2016) special 
issue. For instance, Macbeth et al. (2016: 562) claim that Heritage’s (2002a) analysis of oh-
prefaced responses to assessments uses “a very different arrangement and a very different 
deployment” of sequence organization. They are puzzled by Heritage’s argument that, like 
second assessments (see Pomerantz 1984), first assessments too can be upgraded or 
downgraded. The authors attempt to dismantle Heritage’s analysis by asking “upgraded from 
what?” (Macbeth et al. 2016: 562; emphasis in original). Nonetheless, the early observations 
by Sacks and Schegloff, cited above, clearly invoke a normative order to the particular design 
of actions in particular positions in interaction, with first-position utterances being no 
exception. Moreover, it should be made clear that while Macbeth, et al. (2016: 563) cite 
Pomerantz as evidence for the claims they put forth regarding positionality and 
upgrading/downgrading, Pomerantz’s work clearly distances her the perspective taken by 
Macbeth, et al. (see, e.g., 1986, on extreme case formulations; see also Jefferson, 1980; Pillet-
Shore, 2004). In the same way that an address term can be produced in an “upgraded” 
(Schegloff 2007: 52) fashion vis-à-vis an unmarked design (and will be heard as upgraded by 
virtue of that marked composition), so too can an initial reference to a person be done 
markedly or unmarkedly (Fox 1987; Jackson 2013; Schegloff 1996c; Stivers 2007), and, as 
Heritage (2002a) demonstrates, so too is the case for first assessments. Macbeth et al.’s 
critique suggests a perspective that first actions cannot themselves be upgraded/downgraded, 
which amounts to a claim that participants do not orient to a normative order of position and 
composition in interaction. Such a misguided view would, ipso facto, deny that any speaker 
producing a first-position utterance could ever accomplish any sort of non-normative or 
otherwise marked first action. And yet—as anyone who has had someone scream their name 
to get their attention, instead of just speak it, can tell you—this is plainly not the case.  
 
                                                        
8 Note that the transcription of the Arabic might suggest that l.1 and l.2 consist of single words, but this of course 
represents the articulation of what is standardly transliterated as (in l.1) the greeting as-salamu alaykum and (in 
l.2) its return wa’alaykumu as-salām. 
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b) The biting point: collections and eventful absences 
It is not, however, only in what the data explicitly display that we may find these conclusions; 
the particular methodological power of collections is located just as much in what they throw 
into relief. In a search for “empirical bite”, the biting point for CA is not solely in the empirical 
skewing that emerges through collections of practices, but also in the deviant case: the 
exception that proves the rule. Schegloff’s (1996a) account of describing a hitherto 
undiscovered action—confirming an allusion—is a masterclass in identifying the deviant case, 
and instructive for examining how generalisations emerge through collections of particular 
practices.9 In (4), (5) and (6) below, we see an initial stage: selections from a database of 
exemplars displaying, at the arrowed turns, the practice—repetitions of a prior turn by the 
speaker of a current turn: 
(4) (Schegloff, 1996a:183. Interview with Susan Shreve on U.S. National Public Radio 
concerning her recent novel. E=Bob Edwards, interviewer; S=Susan Shreve) 
 
1 E Why do you write juvenile books. 
2 (0.5) 
3 E [’s that- b-  (0.?)  [hav]ing [children?   ] 
4 S [Because I love child[ren].   [I really do:]= 
5 =.hh I enjoy children:, .hh I started writing: (.) 
6 juvenile books fer entirely pra:ctical reasons, .hh 
7 (.) 
8 S [u- u- 
9 E [Making money::. 
10S→ Making [money 
11E   [yes ((+laughter)) 
12S that- that practical reason hhh 
13 (.) 
14S I’ve been writing juvenile books for a lo:ng.. 
 
(5) (Schegloff, 1996a:174. E=Evelyn; R=Rita. Evelyn has been called to the phone) 
 
1 E =Hi: Rita 
2 R Hi: Evelyn:. How [are y’ 
3 E        [I hadda come in another room. 
4 R Oh:. Uh huh.= 
5 E =I fee:l a bi:ssel verschickert. 
6 (0.2) 
7 R W- why’s ’a:t, 
8 (0.4) 
9 R uh you’ve had sump’n t’drink.= 
10E→ =I had sump’n t’dri:nk. 
11R Uh huh. 
 
(6) (Schegloff, 1996a: 175; E=Evelyn; R=Rita.) 
1 R …y’know we: went to the mo:vies.= 
2 =We went to:uh:m. uh to: (m)u(h): 
3 What’s *the name of(      )  ((off-line)) 
4 E (Sh’beau)? 
                                                        
9 For a mixed quantitative/qualitative demonstration of this, regarding a particular practice for soliciting 
accounts from recipients, see Raymond and Stivers (2016).  
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5 R (**     **) (Millbrae)  ((off-line)) 
6 Millbrae. which is over past Burlingame. 
7 (0.2) 
8 E Yeah th[at’s ’n far away.  
9 R   [(and-) 
10R→ That’s far away. And- there were two good movies… 
 
 
In each of these sequences, the data (at line 10 in each case) show us the same practice of 
repeating the prior speaker’s turn10: not a generalisation “crafted”, but a methodical 
interactional device, publicly and observably present. Also distinctly observable, in each case, is 
the prior sequence. Now if it is evident that the repetitions in each instance are doing 
agreements, it is only by examining this prior sequential context that the particular form of 
agreement being done becomes clear. Schegloff notes that in each case, what is repeated is a 
candidate observation of a prior characterization made by the recipient: in (4) “Making 
money”; in (5) “You’ve had sump’n to drink”; in (6) “That’s far away”. That candidate 
observation, can, on further inspection of the prior talk, be seen to have its origins in what the 
recipient has herself said—an allusion to circumstances which are explicitly formulated in that 
observation. So when, in (4), Susan Shreve says “I started writing: (.) juvenile books fer 
entirely pra:ctical reasons” (lls.5-6), she alludes to, but does not formulate explicitly, the 
objective of ‘making money’. In (5) Evelyn’s claim to feel “a bissel vershickert” (‘a little tipsy’) 
leads to Rita’s candidate understanding that “you’ve had sump’n t’drink” (l.9); and in (6) Rita’s 
formulation of Millbrae as “over past Burlingame” (l.6) can be heard to be characterising it as 
‘far away’. And it is the recipient who, in the practice of repeating the utterance in next turn, 
confirms this candidate observation offered by the other.  
In the course of discovering ‘confirming an allusion’ to be a distinct action, accomplished 
through this practice of repeating a prior turn, Schegloff notes that “the apparently petty ‘who 
is agreeing with whom’ (…) can and does matter” (1996a: 194). In so doing, he makes 
analytically salient a demonstrably relevant distinction that is central to work in epistemics, 
that between confirming and agreeing. It is precisely this distinction that Heritage and 
Raymond (2005) build on in their collections-based analysis of the practices participants use 
in assessment sequences, for instance (see also Heritage 2002a). Temporality is key, with the 
choice to do a confirmation over an agreement demonstrably indexing prior orientation to 
knowledge, a point to which we will return in the next section. 
 
While neither the scope nor the subtlety of Schegloff’s account can be conveyed here, the 
methodological upshot is clear. Not only does the repeating turn respond explicitly to the 
immediately prior turn, it also thereby references the one prior to that: the speaker’s own 
prior turn. So, for one thing, displayed understandings are not simply confined to proximate 
turns-at-talk. Moreover, it is only the identification of ostensibly the ‘same’ practice or action 
across a range of exemplars that makes it possible to specify “environments of relevant 
possible occurrence” (Schegloff, 1993: 104). With these established, it is then possible to 
undertake a search for environments which display “the eventfulness of its absence, or an 
orientation to avoiding it as well as achieving it” (1996a: 192; emphasis in original). As such, an 
                                                        
10 Notwithstanding the exception, in (4), of the deictic shift from “you” to “I”. 
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integral part of the evidence that Schegloff adduces for his account are a case of avoidance—an 
observable withholding of the practice by means of a repair away from it—and a case of 
relevant non-occurrence. In both cases, there is evidence in the data that implementing the 
practice would have been hearably self-serving. Of these two eventful absences, Schegloff 
remarks that: 
“...it is virtually certain that nothing of interest would have been seen at all 
were we not already familiar with…confirming allusions and its 
environments of possible occurrence. Here then we may have some of the 
most distinctive fruits of inquiry in rendering what would otherwise be 
invisible visible in its very absence” (1996a: 199). 
 
The evidence provided by the ‘deviant case’—a methodological precept in CA since it formed a 
pivotal part of Schegloff’s (1968) study of phone call openings—is thus fundamental in nailing 
down the analysis. Indeed, a deviant case plays a pivotal role in Heritage’s original 
examination of oh as a ‘change-of-state’ token (1984: 310), an analysis which Wootton (1989) 
presents as a paradigmatic example of conversation-analytic methodology. The generalisations 
thereby made possible are about as far from “crafted” as it is possible to get. 
 
In their introduction to the special issue, Lynch and Macbeth (2016) claim to “neither ignore 
nor criticize the value of collections in the CA literature” (495). This is revealed to be nothing 
more than mere lip-service, however, as the authors immediately go on to assert: “our primary 
focus is on treatments of singular sequences in the EP [Epistemic Program, sic] publications 
we examine” (496). The justification offered for this is that such an approach adheres to one of 
CA researchers’ principal tasks, namely “not to sacrifice the detailed examination of single 
cases on the altar of broad claims” (Schegloff 2010: 42; cited in Macbeth and Wong, 2016: 
581).  
 
While the contributors to the Lynch et al. special issue direct their line of critique at research 
in epistemics in particular, we agree with Steensig and Heinemann (2016: 604) that this 
criticism is revelatory of “a more general skepticism towards the collection method”.11 For 
Lynch et al., the examination of a single case seemingly purports to remedy what they view to 
be inherent deficiencies in the making of collections. However, for conversation analysts, as 
will be demonstrated more explicitly in the next section, even—and perhaps especially—in the 
analysis of single cases, collections provide the means to disambiguate between what initially 
may appear to be ‘equally correct’ alternative analyses. Looking solely at case (4) above, for 
instance, would not reveal the practice or the action that “making money” is being designed to 
implement, let alone the scope thereof. On the basis of the single case, devoid of comparison to 
any sort of collection, an infinite number of alternative analyses could be posited to explain 
Susan’s responsive turn. And indeed, many of those alternative explanations might appear 
equally defensible in the ignorant bliss of what else is out there. It is only upon situating this 
particular case within a collection of comparable cases—comparable in that they are similar or 
in that they are different (e.g., a deviant case, a type-conforming ‘yeah’, etc.; see next section)—
                                                        
11 Indeed, see Lynch and Wong (2016: 542) for more explicit evidence of the authors’ distaste for—or perhaps 
simple lack of interest in engaging with—collections of interactional phenomena.  
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that the import of the practice and its action becomes clear, both in terms of its relevance to 
this particular moment between these two participants, as well as with regard to the scope of 
the action’s deployment more generally. 
 
Thus, conversation-analytic findings are certainly answerable “to the details of single episodes 
of action” (Schegloff 1987: 102); but from a CA perspective, those details are altogether 
unanalyzable without reference to other instances. This is due to the fact that the examination 
of a single case unavoidably brings to bear, on that single case, the findings and observations 
from examinations of collections.12 And thus, for practitioners of CA, collections are as 
analytically essential as they are unavoidable. Schegloff (1997) reflects on the centrality of 
collections to CA method in discussing what he calls ‘boundary cases’ of phenomena (in his 
case, other-initiated repair). Of instances which at first glance appear to be the target 
phenomenon but which, upon analysis, appear not to be so, he remarks that: 
 
In specifying what makes them ‘look like’, we learn about our phenomenon; 
and in specifying why nonetheless they ‘are not’, we learn as well. And in 
specifying why some instances which look unlike our initiating instances 
belong nonetheless…we do the same. 
 
Boundary cases are on both sides of the boundary, and in specifying the 
boundary, they help specify what belongs inside it and what does not. They 
also help us convert mere interpretation, based on what something seems or 
appears to be, into analysis, where that ‘seeming’ is empirically grounded in 
analytically formulated features of the conduct, features by which it does 
what it is designed to do, and gets so understood by co-participants (1997: 
502). 
 
Collections are thus the sine qua non of analysis; without them, all that remains is 
interpretation.13 
 
 
2. On “actual, produced, and constitutive detail” in practice: The case of epistemics 
 
Work in conversation analysis takes as its starting point the theoretical and methodological 
foundation just described; and conversation-analytic research on epistemics is no exception, 
beginning from the perspective that rights and obligations to knowledge are visibly made 
relevant and lodged firmly in the details of talk.  
 
                                                        
12 Indeed, it is relevant to note that this relationship between collection-building and single cases analyses is also 
embodied in the history of CA’s key publications: It was only after more than a decade of publishing on collections 
of phenomena—that is, after a rigorously defensible analysis of key organizational domains had been 
established—that Schegloff (1987) published his single case analysis, which brought precisely those collections-
based findings to bear on a single case. We are indebted to Geoff Raymond for this observation.   
13 In this respect, Button and Sharrock’s reference to “the fine details of transcript interpretation”’ (our emphasis; 
2016:612), rather than analysis, is revealing (see also next note). 
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One of the central claims of the contributions to the Lynch et al. (2016) special issue is that 
conversation-analytic work in epistemics is “disengaged from the details of the transcript” 
(Lynch and Wong 2016: 539), that it is based on assumptions other than “on an inspection of 
the detailed materials in the fragment” (Lindwall et al., 2016: 512).14 In what follows, we 
target and unpack various components of this claim, with the objective of demonstrating that, 
rather than being produced “at the expense of actual, produced and constitutive detail, and 
what that detail may show us” (Macbeth and Wong, 2016: 585-6; our emphasis), epistemic 
findings are unambiguously anchored in such detail; and indeed, it is precisely our attention to 
these details which, to once again invoke Heritage (this issue), force us to draw certain 
conclusions about participants’ moment-by-moment negotiations of rights and obligations to 
knowledge.   
 
a)  On “writing metrics” 
 
To begin, it is relevant to clarify further the distinction between actions, on the one hand, and 
the practices used to achieve them, on the other, as the inappropriate conflation of these two 
terms seems to be the cause of confusion in the Lynch et al. special issue.  
 
The action in excerpts (4) – (6)—confirming an allusion—is seen to be rooted in the particular 
practice of repeating a prior turn. This is crucial to note because, without attending to the 
details of the practice, it would be impossible to distinguish this particular action from other 
forms of what might otherwise be called simply ‘agreement’. After all, in each case, the speaker 
of the target turn (line 10) is certainly ‘agreeing’ in one sense of the term, and therefore could 
have done so within the sequence with a simple Yes or Mm hm (Raymond, 2003; Stivers, 
2010). Likewise, they might have provided agreement with a particle-prefaced Oh yes or Well 
yes (Heritage, 1998, 2015), or perhaps by way of a marked interjection like Of course or 
Absolutely (Stivers, 2007), or maybe with some sort of phrasal upgrade, downgrade, or 
transformation (e.g., “uh you’ve had sump’n t’drink.” in (5) responded to with Have I ever! Or 
Just a little bit) (e.g., Mikesell, et al., 2017; Stivers and Hayashi, 2010). And yet, while all of 
these may be ‘agreements’ at one level of analysis, none of these ‘alternatives’ was produced. 
The conversation analyst’s task in addressing the omnirelevant inquiry “Why that now?” 
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) is thus necessarily a comparative one that is based in collections of 
phenomena: Schegloff seeks to discover what makes the specific practice he has uncovered 
distinct from these (and other) forms of ‘agreement’ with respect to the particularized action it 
delivers.  
 
Macbeth and Wong take issue with Heritage’s argument that a particular utterance produced 
by a speaker in one excerpt achieves a “simulacrum of agreement” (Heritage, 2011: 160; 
Heritage and Raymond, 2005). They assert that “to find a ‘simulacrum of agreement’ here is to 
write a metric of ‘kinds of agreements’ and then declare what kind this one is. It is an over-
hearer’s measure entirely” (2016: 579). But if agreements don’t come in different ‘kinds’, and 
there is no metric amongst them, are participants’ uses of the widely differing practices of Yes 
vs. Mm hm vs. Oh yes vs. Of course vs. Have I ever vs. Just a little bit, etc.—in addition to 
                                                        
14 Button and Sharrock (2016: 611-12) go so far as to assert that the criticism invoked in the articles “mainly turns 
into disputing the fine details of transcript interpretation”.  
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Schegloff’s repetition-enacted confirming allusions, for that matter—then to be viewed as 
simply random and inconsequential? It would appear that Macbeth and Wong would be 
content to label this range of responses simply as ‘agreements’ and move on. Nonetheless, 
research in conversation analysis takes as its point of departure Sacks’s (1984: 22) 
fundamental assumption that there is “order at all points”, and in so doing has produced 
countless studies—both qualitative and quantitative—which robustly demonstrate not only 
the existence, but also the systematic deployment, of various different sorts of agreement and 
confirmation cross-linguistically (see, e.g., Bolden, 2016; Enfield et al., 2017; Raymond, 2003; 
Raymond, 2015; Stivers, et al., eds., 2010).  
 
To offer but one example, consider the following case from Lao. Speakers A and B are 
discussing a new colleague of B’s. A asks whether the woman has a beautiful figure. B launches 
a turn concerning the woman’s hair, but drops out in overlap with A. In the clear, then, 
following A’s post-position tag question bóó3 ‘right?’, B produces an affirmative response—
“not with qee5 ‘yes’, but with repetition…” (Enfield, 2010: 2662), thereby constituting a 
nonconforming response (Raymond, 2003): 
(7) (Enfield, 2010: 2662) 
01  A:    lèø hun1   laaw2     [ngaam2    mèèn1  bóó3] 
          PRF figure 3SG.FA     beautiful COP    QPLR 
          ‘And her figure is beautiful, right?’ 
 
02  B:                         [phom3 niø-           ] 
                                hair  TPC 
                               [the hair             ] 
 
03        (0.5) 
 
04  B:    hun1   ngaam2 
          figure beautiful 
          ‘Her figure is beautiful’ 
 
As with Schegloff’s study of confirming allusions, B's repetition here involves confirming and 
hence an implied epistemic independence or even primacy—in this case, with respect to what 
her new colleague looks like. 
 
This is but one exemplar of an already substantial and growing, cross-linguistic, cross-cultural 
body of research that has its origins in Schegloff (1996a) and Heritage and Raymond (2005). 
As it clearly illustrates, neither Heritage nor any other analyst has a need to “write metric[s]” 
for interactional phenomena, because the participants—in and through the ‘actual, produced, 
and constitutive detail’ of their different ways of, for example, providing agreement and 
confirmation—have already written the metrics themselves.  
 
b)  On ‘alternative’ analyses 
 
Given the accusation that conversation-analytic work in epistemics is “disengaged from the 
details of the transcript” (Lynch and Wong, 2016: 539), contributors to the Lynch et al. special 
issue attempt to “re-analyze” (Lindwall et al., 2016: 500) the excerpts included in prior work 
with the goal of “question[ing] the solidity of the empirical support thus far presented” (ibid.: 
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520) for epistemic claims (e.g., status and stance). The claim of these authors, of course, is that 
they are attending to the details of the talk that Heritage and others have either actively 
ignored or inadvertently overlooked, and that in so doing, readers will quickly recognize that 
“more detailed accounts can be produced without recourse to epistemic status,” for example 
(ibid.: 517). As Lynch and Wong (2016: 528) succinctly put it: “Our data are transcripts-under-
analysis, and we shall use our re-analyses of these data to call into question the general claims 
and interpretive strategies that we have found to be characteristic of the EP [sic]”.  
 
But are the “re-analyses” offered by Lynch et al. plausible? Do they actually attend to the 
minute details of the talk in the way that they claim to? Or do the details of the talk, and 
situating such details within collections thereof, in fact reveal these analytic ‘alternatives’ to be 
not alternatives at all?  
 
Let us interrogate just one example of “re-analysis,” the very first offered by Lindwall et al. 
with respect to the following fragment (9).   
 
 
(9) [Rah:12:1:ST] 
 
 1  Jen:     °Hello?,° 
 2           (0.5) 
 3  Ida:     Jenny? 
 4           (0.3) 
 5  Ida:     It's me:, 
 6  Jen:     Oh hello I:da. 
 7  Ida:  -> Ye:h. .h uh:m (0.2) ah'v jis rung tih teh- eh tell you (0.3) 
 8        -> uh the things ev arrived from Barkerr'n Stone'ou[:se, 
 9  Jen:  ->                                                 [Oh:::::. 
10           (.) 
11  Jen:     O[h c'n ah c'm rou:nd,h[h 
12  Ida:      [An'                  [Yes please that's w't= 
 
 
Given that declarative utterances can be used to request information as well as to give 
information, Heritage (2012b: 8) uses this case to illustrate the role that epistemic status plays 
in distinguishing between these. Here, Ida’s knowledgeable (K+) status regarding the 
information at hand allows Jenny to interpret her lines 7-8 as an informing action, receipting it 
with the change-of-state token Oh in line 9 (Heritage 1984).  
 
Nonetheless, about this case, Lindwall et al. (2016: 508) contend the following:  
 
Here one could note that the phrase is preceded by “ah’v jis rung tih the- eh tell 
you” (line 7). This means that the lexical and syntactical construction alone 
provides an evident and unequivocal packaging of the declarative as an 
informing action. An account of the turn’s recognizability can thus be 
constructed without reference to epistemic matters.  
 
Lindwall et al.’s ‘alternative’ account of this case, then, is that because the phrasing of Ida’s 
turn projects to “tell”, Jenny will “unequivocal[ly]” understand what comes next as giving 
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information rather than requesting it. As a single case, devoid of the illustrative power of 
collections, such an analysis indeed seems plausible. But does it stand up to scrutiny?  
 
Consider extract (10) below in which Ginny, similar to Ida above, produces a turn that projects 
to “tell” (lines 7-8). And yet the result of this is not an informing action at all, but rather a 
request for confirmation—“You haven't eaten yet?”15—confirmation which Millie immediately 
provides in line 9 with “No wir jist now eating.”.  
 
 
(10) SBL 3.5.R 
01  Mil:     I've (0.2) prayed abaht it'n evryone e:lse ez prayed about 
02           't for me? a:n' uh  p tch khhhhhhhh°hh° EN THEY SAY PRAYER 
03           CHA:NGES EVRYTHING en (.) e- SO IT'S J'S WO^:NDERF'l UHhh 
04           HU[hh 
05  Gin:       [Tha::t's right[ °Mill]y° 
06  Mil:                      [^uhh! ]hh-huh hu[h 
07  Gin:  ->                                   [hhh We:ll 'ee wil hh I 
08        -> tell you wha:' wu- (.) eh-ihHe (.) You haven't eaten yet? 
09  Mil:  -> No wir jist[now]e a t ing.] 
10  Gin:                [W'l]why don'cb]u go ahead Milly hh 
11           (0.2) 
12  Gin:     En u-Ah:'Il sto:p o:n my way down en:nif you feel like (.) 
13           coming with me fi:ne'n:d if y'[do:n't w h y] 
14  Mil:                                   [Yer still go]˘*ing. 
15           (0.3) 
16  Gin:     hh Yeh I think ah'll go o:n.= 
 
Here, then, we have a direct comparison with the case that Heritage analyzes (and Lindwall et 
al. “re-analyze”): The beginning of a TCU with the lexeme “tell”, followed by a pause and a few 
hitches, followed by a phrase produced with declarative morphosyntax and response-
mobilizing (Stivers and Rossano, 2010) intonation. How is it, then, that Jenny understands 
Ida’s declarative as giving information in (9), whereas Millie understands Ginny’s declarative 
as requesting information in (10)? Despite what Lindwall et al. would have us believe, the 
answer cannot be based in the “tell you” part of the turn; as the data show, that doesn’t 
disambiguate between the two action ascriptions in question, as it is common to both cases. 
What does disambiguate them, though, is epistemic status: In (9) the speaker (Ida) has K+ 
status regarding the delivery, and so is heard to be informing, whereas in (10) the speaker 
(Ginny) has K- status regarding her interlocutor’s having eaten or not, and so is heard to be 
asking. 
 
This exemplar, drawn from a mini-collection of just twenty instances, serves to illustrate a 
simple point, namely that the inclusion of “tell X” in a turn-at-talk—especially when preceded 
and followed by hitches, filled pauses, and the like—does not a priori guarantee that what 
comes next will be a telling. And thus the ‘alternative’ analysis that something like “tell” is—in 
and of itself—a sufficient resource for a recipient to “unequivocal[ly]” interpret a subsequent 
                                                        
15 Gail Jefferson, the original transcriber of this extract, included a footnote to this line of the transcript, writing the 
following: “‘eh-ihHe’ as a possible start on ‘eh-ih Have you eaten yet?’”. It appears that, like Heritage, Jefferson too 
was interested in the possible relevance of declarative vs. interrogative syntax (see next subsection).  
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declarative as giving information is revealed to be empirically unsupported.16 The response to 
Lindwall et al.’s (2016: 508) question—“Is the invocation of epistemic status necessary, is it 
helpful, and does it do justice to the demonstrable orientations of the participants?”—then 
quickly becomes a resounding “Yes”. Nonetheless, this disambiguation between what initially 
appeared to be equally plausible analyses is only made possible by situating case (9) within a 
collection of instances. Without such a collection, as Schegloff notes, one is not producing 
“analysis”, but rather “mere interpretation” (1997: 502, original emphasis).  
 
The issue of ‘alternative’ analyses makes relevant clarification of a related point. Heritage’s 
(2012a: 6) assertion that “relative access to particular epistemic domains is treated as a more 
or less settled matter in the large bulk of ordinary interaction” is a source of much difficulty for 
the contributors to the Lynch et al. (2016) special issue. Indeed, Lindwall et al. (2016) describe 
this as “one of the most central and problematic moves of the epistemic program [sic],” and 
they ask: “If the recognizability of social action depends on the recognizability of relative 
knowledge, who is to decide?” (514). Nonetheless, the very posing of this question suggests 
that such decisions are static and wholly unproblematic, when, in reality, no such claim has 
been made in the epistemics literature. Indeed, Heritage is designedly cautious with his 
wording in arguing, for example, that “interactants must at all times be cognizant of what they 
take to be the real-world distribution of knowledge and of rights to knowledge between them as 
a condition of correctly understanding how clausal utterances are to be interpreted as social 
actions” (2012a: 24; italics in original, bolding added). What this means, of course, is that 
participants, in their claims and attributions of knowledge, can and do miscalculate their 
respective statuses, as occurs in (11) below: 
 
(11) Frankel: TC:1:1  
 
1  Shi: -> In any eve::nt?hhhhh That's not all thet's ne:w. 
2  Ger:    W't e:lse. 
3  Shi:    .t.hhhhh W'l Wendy'n I hev been rilly having problems. 
4  Ger:    M-hm, 
5  Shi:    ((voice becomes confiding)) .hh En yesterday I talk'tih 
6          her.  .hhhh A:n' (0.3) apparently her mother is terminal. 
7          (0.5) 
8  Ger: => .tch Yeh but we knew that befo[:re. 
9  Shi:                                  [.hhh Ri:ght. Well, (.) 
10         now I guess it's official. 
11 Ger:    Mm-hm. 
12 Shi:    .t.hhh So she's very very upset. 
 
Here, Shirley claims a knowledgeable position vis-à-vis some piece of news in line 1. 
Nonetheless, in line 8, Geri challenges the legitimacy of this epistemic claim, which Shirley 
attempts to reassert in her subsequent turn (lines 9-10). The relevant point here is that, in 
Heritage’s work, how an interactant’s K+ position is generated is not of import—as long as it is 
                                                        
16 Moreover, the proposed ‘alternative’ analysis invites the question as to how participants go about interpreting 
those turns that do not include some sort of overt lexeme like “tell”—which, to be sure, constitute the vast 
majority of declaratively formatted utterances. This is of course setting aside the fact that, in order to read the 
Lindwall, et al. account as a critique at all, one would have to argue that an explicit claim of K+ status (e.g., via ‘tell 
X’) constitutes evidence against the notion that K+ status is meaningful in interaction. Such an argument strikes 
us as puzzling, to say the least.  
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honored—as the precise origin of one’s K+ position does not affect the fundamental claim that 
it will nonetheless shape how declarative and interrogative utterances are understood in 
action terms (see next section; see also Heritage, this issue).17  
 
Rather than being “disengaged from the details of the transcript” (Lynch & Wong 2016: 539), 
then, the details are precisely what provide the empirical grounding for concepts such as 
stance and status in conversation-analytic work in epistemics. In short, for Lindwall et al. to 
claim that, in work on epistemics, “sequentiality and other potential resources seem to be 
taken out of the picture” (2016: 504) or that it “re-introduces the notion of extra-interactional 
context” (519) is a baffling misunderstanding of a central tenet of such work, asserted in the 
face of all evidence to the contrary. 
 
c)  On ‘craft[ing] generalizations’ and ‘generaliz[ability]’ 
 
In the same vein as the critiques by Macbeth and Wong, and Lindwall et al., discussed above, 
Lynch and Wong (2016: 535) claim that research in epistemics “refers to abstract gradients 
and scales,” presumably referring to the distinction, for example, between declarative and 
interrogative syntax in question formulation. Elsewhere, the authors refer to “an imagined 
alternative in a formal cognitive ‘space’” (540). But, as seen above, these alternatives do not 
have to be imagined; they are regularly deployed by participants themselves, who, in so doing, 
expose their hearable orientations to epistemic matters. In the following extract (12), Leslie 
moves from declarative to interrogative syntax, thereby demonstrating her orientation to the 
distinction between them.  
 
(12) [Field SO(II):1:3:1-9] 
 
 1  Les:     .hhhh I RANG you up- (.) ah: think it wz la:s' night. 
 2        -> But you were- (.) u-were you ou:t? Or: was it the night 
 3           before perhaps. 
 
About this case, Drew (2013: 133) writes: “Leslie discontinues a declaratively-formatted turn, 
You were out, and changes it instead into an interrogative, Were you out?; which is a more 
cautious construction, since all she may know (from ‘her side’; Pomerantz, 1980) is that Hal 
did not answer the phone (notice that she continues more cautiously)”. Cases such as this 
illustrate that there is no need to “craft” “abstract”, “imagined alternatives” “at the expense of 
actual, produced and constitutive detail”—conversation-analytic inquiries into epistemics are 
unambiguously anchored in such detail.  
 
Here again, the distinction between actions and practices becomes relevant as one considers 
the generalizability of conversation-analytic claims regarding epistemics: while action types 
extend cross-linguistically and cross-culturally as of universal import, the specific practices 
used to implement those actions can vary significantly. We already saw cross-linguistic 
variation in our initial examples of Arabic and English responsive utterances: the action of 
                                                        
17 This is, of course, not to say that future conversation-analytic research cannot make this issue—i.e., sources 
from which one’s K+ status can be generated—a targeted topic of inquiry; but simply that it has not yet been 
fleshed out as such because it did not affect the claims Heritage was making.  
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returning a greeting, for instance, remains constant across languages and cultures as a 
sequentially normative expectation (see Kendrick et al., 2014), yet the particular linguistic 
resources available to second speakers with which to design that action can vary. With regard 
to polar questions, the distinction between interrogative and declarative syntax, which is 
unambiguously relevant to speakers of English (as we just saw in (14)), is obviously not 
available (and therefore cannot be relevant) to speakers of 16% of the 842 languages surveyed 
by Dryer (2008) which do not possess interrogative syntax. And indeed, Heritage does not 
make any claim to the contrary. Rather, what he offers in his discussion of morphosyntax is 
effectively a case study of the specific practices that English speakers routinely deploy in 
producing epistemically distinct actions.18,19 
 
Of course, various practices relevantly mobilized to deal with epistemic matters have been 
found to pattern similarly across languages (e.g., on turn-prefacing and change-of-state tokens, 
see Heinemann & Koivisto, eds., 2016; Heritage & Sorjonen 2017; Kim & Kuroshima, eds., 
2013; on question-answer sequences, see Enfield et al., 2017; Raymond, 2015; Stivers et al., 
2010; inter alia); but this is not always the case. Take as a case in point the turn-final particle  
–a in Mandarin Chinese, which Wu (2004: 128) argues exhibits a contrast-invoking property: 
“it is used to mark a discrepancy in knowledge, expectation or perspective regarding some 
state of affairs between the –a speaker and the prior speaker”. The epistemic implications of 
this particle are clearly seen in answers to questions that address presuppositional aspects of 
prior talk (Wu and Heritage, 2017). In the following case, the availability of barbecue in 
Northeastern China is presupposed in A’s comment in line 2, but B nonetheless asks if there is 
barbecue in the Northeast in line 4. A’s answer to this question in line 5 includes a turn-final –a 
particle.   
 
(13) (CMC_01_01) 
 
01  A:    ruguo wo xinyun dehua>neng chi dao,= 
          if    I  lucky  if    can  eat eat 
          ‘If I am lucky enough >(I’ll) be able to eat (the buns),’= 
 
02        =.hhh ranhou wo rang ta:: dai  wo qu chi::: kaorou.= 
                then   I  let  her  take I  go eat    barbecue 
          =‘Then I’ll ask her:: to take me to eat::: barbecue.’= 
 
03        =wo bu zhidao ta- tongyi bu tongyi. 
           I  N  know   3sg agree  N  agree 
          =‘I don’t know whether or not she’d- agree.’ 
 
04  B: -> dongbei   you  kaorou   a. 
          northeast have barbecue PRT 
          ‘There is barbecue in the Northeast?’ 
                                                        
18 Nonetheless, the distinction between interrogative and declarative syntax has indeed proven significant and 
relevant well beyond English, in other languages that possess this distinction in their grammar (see, e.g., 
Raymond, 2015; Stivers et al., eds., 2010).  
19 Another example of cross-linguistic variation can be found in interrogative intonation: While in some languages, 
like English, interrogative intonation is achieved with a rising contour, in others (e.g., Icelandic, Cha’palaa) it is 
falling (Dingemanse et al., 2013). Thus the specific linguistic design of the practice is distinct cross-linguistically, 
despite similarities in what the practice is mobilized to accomplish—e.g., in the case of interrogative intonation, to 
question, to index non-finality or uncertainty (Gussenhoven 2004), or to mobilize response (Stivers & Rossano 
2010). 
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05  A: -> dui   a.  
          right PRT 
          ‘(That’s) right A.’ 
 
As Heritage (1998) finds with oh-prefaced responses in English, here too a resource is 
deployed to mark that a prior question is unexpected and inapposite due to its questioning 
something that was already presupposed in prior talk (Wu and Heritage, 2017). The resource 
itself is of course distinct; English, unlike Mandarin, does not have turn-final particles. But 
practices in these typologically distinct languages appear to be managing the same distinctive 
epistemic issue. The general methodological point is this: that identifying a systematic 
interactional contingency in data from one language or speech community makes it possible to 
establish whether other languages have practices for managing the very same contingency. 
Herein lies the power and reach of CA methodology. 
  
With respect to cross-linguistic research and issues of generalizability, our goal as 
conversation analysts is to uncover findings “about apparently omnipresent organizational 
issues and contingencies of interaction, and the practices of conduct and organization of such 
practices…which can be formulated in more abstract ways that transcend different 
particularized embodiments in different languages and cultures but which accommodate their 
specifications…” (Schegloff, 2009: 373). The growing number of cross-linguistic studies in CA 
all point to epistemic positioning as being a lively concern to participants engaging in social 
interaction. As has been repeatedly documented, the specific practices for dealing with 
epistemic issues can certainly vary across languages, but what remains constant is the fact 
participants are deploying them for that very purpose—to deal with epistemic issues. Our 
understanding of this has not emerged through “crafting generalizations,” but rather has 
developed, again, through close examination of the “actual, produced, and constitutive detail” 
of turn-by-turn talk. 
 
 
3. On actions through practices: what linguistics does for CA, and CA for linguistics 
 
For linguists, work in epistemics has proven attractive precisely for what it has revealed about 
relative knowledge as a sequential phenomenon. The “omnipresent engine of epistemic order” 
invoked by Lynch and Wong, as they would recognize, gives us generalization, but no bite. The 
irony here—that CA is often criticized by theoretical linguists for being all bite and no 
generalization—is not lost on us. A central attraction for those of us who work in CA has been 
how, starting from the bite, it has massively expanded the scope of study to include 
phenomena that were formerly (and, for many, still) beyond the linguistic pale. From the 
earliest days, laughter has been an object of analytic interest: Sacks’s Lecture 2, from Fall 1964 
(1992), entitled ‘On suicide threats getting laughed off’ (which of course predates the 
appearance, in 1965, of Chomsky’s ‘ideal speaker-listener’) and Jefferson’s subsequent work 
on laughter (e.g. 1979, 1984, 1985, 2004) opened up whole seams of interactional research for 
linguists, whatever their subdisciplinary affiliations, from semantics to phonetics. Jefferson’s 
later discussion of ‘a frog in the throat’ (2010) paved the way for further work on other sorts 
of vocalisations; for example, Hoey (2014) shows how sighing accomplishes specific work in 
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interaction and that “the variable positioning and delivery of sighs [are] responsive to and 
relevant for ongoing, incipient, and concluding units of action” (196).  
 
In turn, linguists have brought their specialisms to bear on the data of interaction, not only in 
the comparative data of languages other than English,20 but also in technical areas beyond the 
reach of early CA work. One such area of distinct expertise, lying outside the disciplinary 
origins of CA, is phonetics.21 So, for example, our understanding of turn-taking has been 
enhanced by observations made by Local and Walker (2012) regarding the role of phonetic 
features in projecting either more talk, or turn completion, in English; and by Ogden (2004), 
who examines non-modal voice quality (informally, ‘creaky voice’) in signaling turn-transition 
in Finnish. Similarly, Clayman and Raymond (2015) offer an analysis of what they term 
‘modular pivots’, focusing on how the phonetic realization of these items plays a demonstrably 
significant role in circumventing potential turn-transfer and retaining the floor beyond a 
projected transition-relevance place. In addition, Ogden’s (2013) work on clicks and 
percussives—part of the linguistic (i.e., phonemic) repertoire of many southern and some east 
African languages, but not English—shows a regular interactional distribution in English, 
marking incipient speakership in pre-turn position or in mid-turn position in word searches 
(Wright, 2011). Ogden further observes how these sounds are intricated into, and associated 
with, other behaviours, such as breathing and swallowing, which can also display highly 
systematic organization (see also Hoey, 2015).  
 
Voice quality and clicks—the sort of phenomena that phoneticians are ideally placed to 
investigate—embody exactly the sort of “actual, produced, and constitutive detail” that 
Macbeth and Wong (2016: 586) would have us accountable to. But Macbeth and Wong’s  
evident approval of, in their words, “the disciplined work of writing production accounts that 
are faithful to the occasion’s evident detail” (2016: 592, fn 2) sits oddly, to say the least, with 
their assertion that ‘The transcript we present here [at their excerpt 1a] reduces some of the 
detail and symbols used by Jefferson in her original transcript’ (ibid.: 592, fn 4). Below, as 
excerpt (16a), we present lls. 49-59 of the original Jefferson transcript, so we can see, at the 
arrowed turns, exactly those “detail and symbols” discarded by Macbeth and Wong (2016: 
578) in their presentation of the excerpt: 
 
 
(14a) NB IV:10:R:21 
 
49 Lot:      Yih'av no idea it's right across the street from the::: 
50     →   El Dorad*o. 
51 Emm:  →   .t Oh:↑::↓::*::. 
52 Lot:      Ye:ah. 
53 Emm:  →   Oh not near the Indian W*e:lls. 
                                                        
20 Clift (2016) makes reference to CA methods used in research in the following languages: ǂAkhoe Haiǀǀom, Arabic, 
LSA (Lengua de Señas Argentina, Argentinian Sign Language), Bequian Creole, Bikol, Cebuano, Cha’palaa, Chintang, 
Danish, Duna, Dutch, Finnish, French, Garrwa, German, Guyanese Creole, Hebrew, Hungarian, Icelandic, Ilokano, 
Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Kri, Lahu, Lao, Mandarin, Murrinh-Patha, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, 
Quiche, Russian, Siwu, Spanish, Thai, Tsou, Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Yélî Dnye, Yucatec Maya and Yurakaré. 
21 Which is not to claim that phenomena standardly labelled ‘phonetic’ had not been examined in such work; see, 
for example, Jefferson (1974, 1983) for explicit engagements with such matters.  
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54        (1.0) 
55 Lot:  →   °ihYe::ah:?° (0.2) It's ih-*i-Indian We:lls? uh well it's 
56    a:ll Indi[an We[:lls'n P]a:lm Desert now they've cha:nged= 
57 Emm:  →              [.hhhh[ Ye*ah. ] 
58 Lot:     =it yihkn[ow tuh P]a:lm De:sert, 
59 Emm:                 [Yeah:.  ] 
 
Table 1 shows the original Jefferson transcriptions and their corresponding simplification by 
Macbeth and Wong: 
 
Line Jefferson Macbeth and Wong Omitted 
50 El Dorad*o. El Torrero • Non-modal voice quality (NMVQ) 
• Stress 
51 .t Oh:↑::↓::*::. Oh:::. 
• Turn-initial dental click 
• NMVQ 
• Intonation 
• Extent of lengthening 
53 Indian W*e:lls. Indian We:lls. • NMVQ 
55 ih-*i-Indian We:lls? ih-i-Indian We:lls • NMVQ 
• Turn-final intonation 
57 [.hhhh[ Ye*ah. ] [.hhhh[ Yeah. ] • NMVQ 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Jefferson and Macbeth & Wong’s transcripts 
 
 
In addition, the alignment of the transcript in Macbeth and Wong is such that l.57 appears to 
be produced much later—a full syllable later—than the original shows it to be.22 This is the 
kind of “detail” which Macbeth and Wong apparently deem dispensable; and yet, as we have 
seen, it is in just these kinds of phenomena—voice quality, clicks, intonation, and overlap 
placement—that conversation analysts can test the robustness of Sacks’s initial 
methodological assumption of  “order at all points” (1984: 22; see Hepburn & Bolden, 2017; 
Jefferson 2004).  
 
Let us examine just one example from the above table: the ‘Oh’ at l.51, stripped, in the 
transcription by Macbeth and Wong, of its prefacing, turn-initial dental click (Wright, 2011), 
the non-modal voice quality (Ogden, 2004), and—something which is unmistakable when 
listening to the audio recording—a very distinctive rising-falling intonation. The last of these 
features, the intonation, is precisely the subject of Local (1996), a paper that investigates a 
variety of prosodic features of oh, including voice quality (with many instances of non-modal 
voice quality accompanying oh) and intonation contour. Based on a robust collection of ohs, 
                                                        
22 As, e.g., Jefferson (1986) makes clear, evidence from overlap yields strong evidence for speakers’ fine 
judgement in the placement of their turns, and certainly within the range of a spoken syllable. To put this in 
context, Greenberg, on a four-hour phonetically transcribed sample of spontaneous talk, finds that the mean 
average time to produce a syllable of spoken English is 200 ms. (1999: 170).  
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Local demonstrates that the rising-falling pitch contour accompanying the production of oh 
routinely accomplishes “displays of having been misinformed and displays of forgetfulness” 
(1996: 205). Moreover, he goes on to show that such a contour on oh “prefaces more talk from 
the same speaker, which has an explicit display of the previous misinformedness or 
forgetfulness” (ibid.). Examining Jefferson’s transcript at (14a) above, it is clear that Emma’s 
“oh” at l.51, is followed, after a brief acknowledgement by Lottie, by more talk from Emma at 
l.53, which indeed has an explicit display—“oh not near the Indian Wells”—of her previous 
misinformedness. This sequence yields further evidence to support Local’s proposal. But of 
course position can only be informative when combined with the “actual, produced and 
constitutive detail” of composition. The excerpt of the transcription reproduced below makes 
plain that Macbeth and Wong’s omission of such compositional particulars—here, the rising-
falling intonation at l.51—would make such analysis impossible: 
 
(14b) (Macbeth and Wong, 2016: 578) 
 
49 Lot:      Yih'av no idea it's right across the street from the::: 
50      El Torrero. 
51 Emm: → Oh:::. 
52 Lot:      Ye:ah. 
53 Emm:   Oh not near the Indian We:lls. 
 
Local (1996) shows that a freestanding oh accompanied by a terminal falling pitch movement, 
as presented in Macbeth and Wong’s transcription at l.51, is a different interactional object 
from that in fact produced by these participants and originally transcribed by Jefferson: they 
are, in other words, distinct practices. Cavalier disregard for “detail and symbols” cannot but 
have analytic implications.23  
  
Such research produced by linguists with specific technical expertise has extended and 
consolidated work in CA beyond its original home base. But of course the research territory is 
today broader still: any audiovisual conduct which accompanies or even replaces the verbal 
has now been brought to the analytic table; so, to give but one example, the whole realm of 
embodied interaction and gaze (pioneered by Goodwin, 1979, 1981) is a flourishing research 
enterprise (see, e.g., Streeck, Goodwin & LeBaron, eds., 2011).  
 
                                                        
23 It cannot go without mention that transcription details are but one of the inconsistencies in Macbeth and 
Wong’s work. Macbeth and Wong (2016) is unambiguously an attack on Heritage’s analysis of oh as a token that 
signals a “change of state of knowledge, information, orientation or awareness” (1984: 299). Nonetheless, both of 
these authors have previously incorporated this very analysis in their own prior work. For instance, Macbeth 
(1990: 208) writes that, with oh, a speaker in an excerpt under analysis “claims, finally, his understanding of the 
matters the teacher has been speaking of”. The author does the same in the examination of another sequence 
wherein he writes that a certain utterance is “received with the student's Oh in line 7, as he proceeds to answer in 
light of this new understanding of what the question was” (Macbeth 2005: 728-729, our emphasis). An even more 
explicit endorsement of Heritage’s work is found in Wong (2004: 123) who, in a study of conversations involving 
second-language speakers, notes that a speaker’s “turn initial item Oh, which is followed by three 
acknowledgment tokens (yeah:: yeah:: yeah::), signals a change of information state (Heritage 1984) or 
understanding ‘just now’”. It would appear, then, that the distaste with which these authors view Heritage’s 
analysis of oh is as inconsistent as it is unsubstantiated.  
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But if CA has redefined for many the boundaries of linguistic research, it has also, just as 
crucially, interrogated and, in many cases, reconfigured our units of analysis. The convergence 
of linguistic concerns with CA methods has frequently revealed the limits of linguistic 
categories as descriptively adequate for interaction. So, for example, Curl et al., investigating 
the phonetic properties of utterance repetitions in interaction, note that: 
 
we have found no evidence that ‘prosody,’ as commonly conceived, is 
relevant or useful in explaining participants’ understandings of 
utterances. That is, the separate and individuated treatment of phonetic 
resources which are typically dubbed ‘prosodic’ does not seem to be 
warranted by the observable behaviour of participants. This is not to say 
that resources which might fall under the rubric of ‘prosody’ are not at 
work here: they plainly are. However, we have shown that these 
resources only form a part of the practice, which incorporates features of 
lexis, articulatory details, loudness, duration, syllabic make-up, and a 
variety of pitch characteristics. Furthermore, the part played by 
‘prosodic’ resources seems no greater than that played by others (2006: 
1748).  
 
The notion that ‘prosody’ is a defensible linguistic category is here deftly dismantled because it 
does not seem to be warranted by the observable behaviour of participants. And it is in 
investigating the practice (for Curl, et al., of utterance repetitions) that this conclusion is 
reached. 
 
This is not, of course, to claim that CA is simply dismantling linguistic categories wholesale, but 
to show the necessity of embedding those categories in interactional warrants. So, for 
example, Thompson and Couper-Kuhlen (2005) provide evidence from both English and 
Japanese to suggest that a grammatical entity—the clause—is indeed a locus of interactional 
order, even if the ways in which it affords projectability vary with the resources of the 
particular language. As they note, “in each case the practices used are precisely the ones which 
the clausal grammatical formats in the given language promote” (2005: 481; italics ours). 
 
Work in epistemics has its origins in exactly the same method of starting with the practice. 
Heritage and Raymond’s foundational (2005) paper brings together observations on the 
practice of oh-prefacing (Heritage, 2002a) with Raymond’s (2003) study of responses to yes-
no interrogatives and Schegloff’s (1996a) repetition-enacted confirming allusions. From 
Schegloff comes the initial distinction between affirmation and confirmation, which Raymond 
builds on in positing a distinction between answers that are type-conforming and those that 
are nonconforming. From Heritage comes a particularization of oh’s change-of-state semantics 
to the sequential context of responses to assessments, the oh indexing epistemic independence 
or priority relative to a first assessment. In all three cases, we see responsive practices that are 
deployed systematically and ‘for cause’ by participants, with Heritage and Raymond linking 
these (and other, e.g., Heritage 2002b) practices together in their examination of how social 
actors manage epistemic rights when making assessments. To again quote Schegloff (1996a: 
194), “the apparently petty ‘who is agreeing with whom’ (…) can and does matter”, and what 
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Heritage and Raymond (2005) provide is an analysis of the means by which this is 
demonstrably achieved by and for interactants.  
 
Aside from the obvious (and, in this responsive special issue, oft-iterated) point that this 
hardly constitutes a ‘program’, these origins are worth remembering for what they show us 
about how such work evolved: through attention, in the first place, to practices of interaction. 
The first two sections of Schegloff’s paper on confirming allusions concern actions, and 
describing actions. The next, where he introduces the data, is entitled ‘Initial Noticings, and a 
Puzzle’. Having presented the excerpts (in this paper reproduced as (5) and (6) above), 
Schegloff writes: “The initial puzzle was, Is something special going on here? What are these 
repeats doing? Or, more precisely, what (if anything) are these repeats being distinctively used 
to do when employed as the means for agreeing or confirming?” (1996a: 175). In the discovery 
of action it is thus with the eye-catching practice that CA inquiry begins, where epistemic 
research has its source, and with which linguistics is increasingly having to come to terms. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
While the understanding of language as action traces its origins to Wittgenstein (1953) and 
subsequently Austin (1962), within linguistics it has found its most influential expression in 
Searle’s programme of Speech Act Theory (1975). However, while Speech Act Theory in 
principle puts action at its centre, it lacks any engagement with actual practice and so is 
correspondingly inattentive to how we come to recognize individual actions as such. The 
enterprise within Speech Act Theory of mapping functions onto forms in vacuo (e.g. Searle, 
1975), necessarily disengages action from sequential context. With no recourse to the details 
of practices in context, this enterprise has inevitably stalled (on which, see Heritage, 2012: 2). 
 
It is perhaps ironic that the rationalist, cognitive turn in linguistics, while resolutely non-
empirical in principle, has in fact mandated a search for universals – not least in Chomsky’s 
(1965) postulation of a Universal Grammar. Debate concerning the existence or otherwise of 
such universals has been vigorous (see, e.g., Evans and Levinson, 2009; Levinson and Evans, 
2010). However the most prominent such debate concerning one putative universal, syntactic 
recursion (see, for example, Jackendoff and Pinker, 2005, Everett, 2005, 2009, and the 
responses in Nevins et al., 2009), has dissolved into acrimonious disputes concerning data 
quality and standards of evidence (for a summary, see Pullum, 2012). Within linguistics, then, 
the search for universals appears to have hit a roadblock. 
 
In the face of such a methodological impasse in linguistics, it has become increasingly clear 
that the empirical methods of CA are providing a way through. We have, in the preceding 
pages, shown how CA enables us to gain traction on the construction of action through the 
identification of specific interactional practices. One of the less anticipated implications of such 
work, albeit no less significant, is the light it has shed on the search for universals. While the 
pioneering work in CA was done on English, it is clear that its methods take us way beyond its 
original linguistic home – the Arabic, Lao and Mandarin cited in this paper providing only 
samples of the research being conducted on other languages. Such comparative work is 
repeatedly revealing that universals reside not, as linguists have assumed, in the structure of 
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languages, but rather in what Schegloff calls the “procedural infrastructure of interaction” 
(Schegloff, 1992b: 1338): the preconditions for interaction itself. So turn-taking, the 
organisation of sequences, the organization of repair mechanisms in talk, the conversational 
preference for particular actions—all part of that procedural infrastructure, are proving to be 
empirically robust across the structural variation and diversity of languages and language 
groups (see, e.g. Clift, 2016; Enfield et al., 2017; Kendrick et al., 2014; Stivers et al., 2010). And 
of course such cross-linguistic analysis is also able to identify the extent to which specific 
practices may be universal. So, to take a simple example from the domain of repair, an initial 
survey of twenty-one languages by Enfield et al. (2013) provides further evidence of some 
remarkable commonalities across one particular practice for other-initiated repair. English 
has Huh? as a primary interjection strategy (Bloomfield, 1933: 176). It turns out that, in the 
languages surveyed,24 such open-class repair initiators (Drew, 1997) show a strikingly similar 
phonetic form: a monosyllable featuring an open non-back vowel [a,æ,ə,ʌ], often nasalized, 
sometimes with an [h] onset, and usually with rising intonation (op.cit: 343). This has led 
Dingemanse et al. (2013) to propose, on a subset of ten languages, that Huh? is, in fact, a 
universal word.  
 
Thus, the methods of CA – which originated with someone, of course, who was not 
investigating language per se – have been mobilized by researchers with linguistic expertise to 
identify the particular practices that implement actions both in and across languages. In doing 
so, they are illuminating an issue central to linguistics; the effect has been to throw a gestalt 
switch on our understanding of the origins and development of language itself.  As Levinson 
observes: 
 
…language is held to be essentially universal, whereas language use is 
thought to be more open to cultural influences. But the reverse may in 
fact be far more plausible: there is obvious cultural codification of many 
aspects of language from phoneme to syntactic construction, whereas the 
uncodified, low-level background of usage principles or strategies may be 
fundamentally culture-independent…Underlying presumptions, 
heuristics and principles of usage may be more immune to cultural 
influence simply because they are prerequisites for the system to work at 
all, preconditions even for learning language (2000: xiv). 
 
As the work of Heritage makes clear, one fundamentally culture-independent part of that 
universal infrastructure, “an object of massive orientation” (Heritage, 2012a: 25), is located in 
who knows what, and who is entitled to know what. And it is just this that (to cite but one 
                                                        
24 The languages surveyed (with their locations in square brackets and interjection forms in round brackets are: 
ǂAkhoe Haiǁom [Namibia] (hɛ), Cha’palaa [Ecuador] (aː), Chintang [Nepal] (hā), Duna [Papua New 
Guinea] (ɛ̃ː/hm), Dutch [Netherlands] (hɜ), English [UK] (hãː/hm), French [France], (ɛ̃), Hungarian 
[Hungary] (hm(ha)), Icelandic [Iceland] (ha ), Italian [Italy] (ɛː), Kri [Laos] (haː), Lao [Laos] (hãː), 
Mandarin Chinese [Taiwan] (hãː), Murrinh-Patha [Australia] (aː), Russian [Russia] (ha), Siwu [Ghana] (hã), 
Spanish [Spain] (e), Tzeltal [Mexico] (hai), Yélî-Dnye [Papua New Guinea] (ɛ̃), Yurakaré [Bolivia] (æ/a), and LSA 
(Argentine Sign Language).  
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example) throws light on the form-function conundrum in linguistics, showing us how 
interrogative morphosyntax and prosody may be overridden by epistemic concerns.  
 
If linguists’ understanding of what is universal is, thanks to CA, undergoing a paradigm shift, so 
equally has our understanding of how knowledge is constituted in interaction: as an emergent, 
oriented-to, sequential matter. It is deeply ironic that Lynch and Wong characterize what they 
call the ‘Epistemics Program’ as cognitivist “in the way it emphasizes information exchange as 
an underlying, extrasituational ‘driver’ in social interaction” (2016: 526) because, for 
increasing numbers of linguists, conversation-analytic work in epistemics is so clearly 
distinctive from (Fischer, 2015) and supercedes the cognitivist, linguistic model of information 
exchange. That it does so is due, in no small part, to the “empirical bite” that linguistics has 
been lacking.  
 
Local (1996) notes that in 1935 the British linguist J.R. Firth called for a form of enquiry that 
treated speech forms as contextualised productions, and in doing so warned against 
developing nothing more than “a loose linguistic sociology without formal accuracy” (Firth, 
1935:36, quoted in Local, 1996: 179). As we have illustrated here, that formal accuracy is to be 
located in the analysis of “actual, produced and constitutive detail” in collections of cases. 
 
This much is uncontroversial: CA is a flourishing research enterprise (see Sidnell & Stivers, 
eds., 2013),25 and has developed in ways utterly unforeseen in its early days. But since at least 
Sacks et al. (1974), there has been a strand which is distinctively linguistic. And increasingly, 
linguists are finding in the synergy between CA methods and linguistic inquiry insights that 
enrich and transform both. The truth is, plainly, that Lynch’s “juggernaut”, albeit a vivid and 
striking rhetorical device, never really existed. 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
25 For example, the last International Conference on Conversation Analysis (ICCA) at UCLA in 2014 took place 
over five days (plus an additional three days of pre-conference workshops), boasted nearly 500 attendees, and 
contained nine parallel sessions each day.  
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